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Abstract
The paper studies a new approach to multi-agency using temporal relational mod-
els with multi-valuations. A kernel distinction from the standard relational models
is introduction of separate valuation for each agent and then computation the global
valuation using the all individual agent’s valuation. We discuss this approach, illus-
trate it with examples and demonstrate that this is not a mechanical combination
of standard models, but much more thin and sophisticated modeling knowledge and
computation truth values in multi-agent environment. Based at these models we de-
fine logical language with temporal formulas and introduce logics based at classes of
such models. The main mathematical problem we are dealing with is the satisfiability
problem. We solve it and find deciding algorithms. In the final part of our paper we
discuss interesting open problems for possible further investigations.
Keywords: multi-agent logics, information, knowledge, temporal logic, multi-valuations
at relational models, satisfiability problem, solving algorithms
1 Introduction
Logical foundations of Information Sciences, and Computer Sciences o have been widely
studied for reasoning about correctness, consistency and reliability of information. In
particular, multi-agent logics, e.g. with modalities interpreted as agent’s operations, or
oriented to model checking, were used for study interaction and autonomy, effects of co-
operation (cf. e.g. Woldridge and Lomuscio [1], Woldridge [2,3], Lomuscio et al [4]),
Babenyschev and Rybakov [5,6,7,8], Rybakov [9]). For example, representation of agent’s
interaction (as a dual of common knowledge) was suggested in Rybakov [9]. A concept
of common knowledge for agent’s was formalized and profoundly analyzed in Fagin et al
[10] using as a base agent’s knowledge (S5-like) modalities. Knowledge, as a concept itself,
came from multi-agency, since individual knowledge may be obtained only from interaction
of agents, learning.
The conception of knowledge was in a focus of AI and Logic in Computer Science for
long ago. As a general field, knowledge-representation is a part of AI which is devoted to
designing computer representations for capture information about the world that can be
used to solve complex problems. The approach to model knowledge in terms of symbolic
logic, probably, may be dated to the end of 1950. At 1962 Hintikka wrote the book:
Knowledge and Belief, the first book-length work to suggest using modalities to capture
the semantics of knowledge. This book laid much of the groundwork for the subject, but
a great deal of research has taken place since that time.
Some important feature of multi-agent environment is the observation that receiving
of knowledge, interaction of agents, cooperation, – occur during some intervals of time,
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and the length of this interval might be very importance. To capture this observation CS
often use symbolic (mathematical) temporal logic. Historically, investigations of temporal
logic in framework of mathematical/philosophical logic being based at modal systems was
originated by Arthur Prior in the late 1950s.
Since then temporal logic has been (and is) very active area in mathematical logic,
information sciences, AI and CS overall (cf. e.g.. – Gabbay and Hodkinson [11,12,13]).
One of important cases of such logics is the linear temporal logic LTL, which was used
for analyzing protocols of computations, verification of consistency. Automaton technique
to solve satisfiability in this logic was developed by Vardi [14,15]). Temporal ontology
and temporal discourse was investigated and discussed in van Benthem [16]. Further, to
evolve mathematical tools of LTL, the solution for admissibility problem for LTL was
found in Rybakov [17], the basis for admissible rules of LTL was obtained in Babenyshev
and Rybakov [18]. Recently modeling multi-agency in assumption of non-transitive time
was studied in Rybakov [19,20].
This paper is devoted to study a new approach to multi-agency using temporal relational
models. These models have many valuations, a separate one for each agent, and the global
one which to be computed from individual once by special rules. Main distinction from
the standard approach is new rules for computation truth values of formulas (which will
use switches of valuations). We will illustrate with examples why this is not merely a
mechanical combination of usual rules. Using such models we define logics for classes of
models and study their properties. The main mathematical problem we are dealing with
is the satisfiability problem. We solve it and find deciding algorithms. In the final part of
our paper we discuss interesting open problems and possible further investigations.
2 Motivation, Definitions, Notation
Before to define the language of logical systems describing multi-agent’s environment, we
preliminarily motivate the background for its introduction. First, just to recall, we outline
the notion of relational models in an informal way. These models are often used for analysis
and representation information (cf. e.g. relational databases). Relational models usually
may be viewed as tuples 〈W, {Ri | i ∈ I}, V 〉 which have a base set W - the set of worlds
(or states) of these models, a set of binary relations {Ri | i ∈ I} on these worlds (i.e. any
Ri is a subset of W x W ) and V is a valuation of a set Prop of propositional variables
(letters) in these models. That is, for any p ∈ Prop, V (p) ⊆ W . Then if w ∈ W and
w ∈ V (p), we say p is true at the world w.
The relations Ri are usually refereed as particular accessibility relations between the
worlds (or alternatively states). Then usually a logical language, typically based on Boolean
logic and using special logical operations modeling properties of these relations, is intro-
duced. Formulas of these languages are terms constructed out of letters by means of logical
operations, the formulas describe properties of the models. Special rules defining compu-
tation of the truth values of the formulas are introduced; and the logic usually is defined
as the set of all formulas which are true at any world of such specified models.
Looking at these general framework we first discuss the way to embed multi-agent
approach. And a first idea is to consider many valuations - V1, . . . , Vk in such models
instead of only the one unique fixed one. Then any Vi represents view-point of the agent
i on truth of the atomic statement - propositional letters, and w ∈ Vi(p) would mean that
the agent i think that the statement p is true at the world w.
Now we introduce relational models with which we will work. Let Prop be a set of
propositional letters.
Definition 1. A temporal Linear k-model with agent’s multi-valuations is the structure
M := 〈N ,≤,Next, V1, . . . , Vk, V0〉,
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where N is the set of all natural numbers, ≤ is the standard order on N , Next is the
binary relation, where a Next b if b = a+1, any Vj is a valuation of Prop (that is for any
p ∈ Prop, Vj(p) ⊆ N ).
We will use the convenient notation Next(n) = m to represent n Next m (i.e. to
consider Next as the relation and as the function).
These models have a wide range of applications: they may represent (i) computa-
tional runs(in particular – threads, as often for usual linear temporal logic), (ii) surfing via
networks, Internet, databases collections (N then will represent sequence of steps in the
search), (iii) sequences of queries for relational databases, (iv) evolutions of social objects
in time, etc. Any a ∈ N is called a state (or alternatively, as in Kripke semantics - a
world), Vj(p) represents the set of all states where the atomic statement (proposition) p is
true from viewpoint of the agent j. For all a ∈ N and any p ∈ Prop we write
(M, a) °Vj p ⇔ a ∈ Vj(p),
and say p is true at a w.r.t. Vj . But V0 here is a special valuation - global one - chosen by
these models to fix objective truth relation, this valuation, in a sense, summarizes opinions
of all agents. Ways to construct V0 out of all Vj may be different. E.g. we may consider
(I) (M, a) °V0 p ⇔
||{j | (M, a) °Vj p, j 6= 0}|| > ||{j | (M, a) 1Vj p, j 6= 0}||,
This means the majority of agents believe that p is true.
(II) (M, a) °V0 p ⇔
||{j | (M, a) °Vj p, j 6= 0}|| ≥ ||{j | (M, a) 1Vj p, j 6= 0}||,
This would mean that p is plausible.
(III) (M, a) °V0 p ⇔
(||{j | (M, a) °Vj p, j 6= 0}||)/(||{j | (M, a) 1Vj p, j 6= 0}||) > 3,
(for ||{j | (M, a) 1Vj p, j 6= 0}|| 6= 0). This would mean p is true from viewpoint of
dominating majority of agents..
There are very many ways to express what means global valuation and what indeed
means the dominant part of agents. Maybe the agent’s opinion may be considered with an
appropriate prescribed weights; maybe depending on different states, the rules to compute
global valuation may be different, etc. In the very limit point we may assume V0 to be
arbitrary, which does not depend on all Vj - it is the opinion of a total dominant - the only
true what V0 thinks to be true.
Now we discuss how to express truth values of statements describing properties of
models. For this we fix a logical language, which use formulas built up from a (potentially
infinite) set Prop of atomic propositions (synonymously - propositional letters, variables).
Definition 2. The set Form of all formulas for our multi-agent logic contains Prop and
is closed w.r.t. applications of Boolean logical operations ∧,∨¬,→, the unary operations
N i (next) (i ∈ [0, k]) and the binary operations Ui, i ∈ [0, k] (until, each one for the agent
i).
The formula Niϕ has meaning: ϕ holds in the next time point (state) for the agent i;
ϕUiψ can be read: ϕ holds until ψ will be true in the opinion of the agent i.
Thus, we defined our semantics - models, and defined formulas - logical language. Now
we need rules for computation truth values at our models for compound, long formulas.
Let a temporal linear k-model with agent’s multi-valuations
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M := 〈N ,≤,Next, V1, . . . , Vk, V0〉,
be given. That is, for any letter p ∈ Prop Vi(p) ⊆ N . If a ∈ N and a ∈ Vi(p) we write
(M, a) °Vi p and say that p is true at a w.r.t. the valuation Vi. The truth values may be
expanded from letters to all formulas as follows.
Definition 3.
∀p ∈ Prop, (M, a) °Vj p ⇔ a ∈ N ∧ a ∈ Vj(p);
(M, a) °Vj (ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇔ (M, a) °Vj ϕ ∧ (M, a) °Vj ψ;
(M, a) °Vj ¬ϕ ⇔ not[(M, a) °Vj ϕ];
(M, a) °Vj Niϕ ⇔ ∀b[(a Next b)⇒(M, b) °Vi ϕ];
(M, a) °Vj (ϕUiψ) ⇔ ∃b[(a ≤ b) ∧ ((M, b) °Vi ψ)∧
∀c[(a ≤ c < b) ⇒ (M, c) °Vi ϕ]].
Wemay define other logical operations using the postulated ones. The modal operations
2i (necessary for agent i) and 3i (possible for agent i) might be defined via temporal
operations as follows: 3ip := >Uip, 2ip := ¬3i¬p. It might be easily verified that then
(M, a) °Vj 3iϕ ⇔ ∃b ∈ N [(a ≤ b) ∧ (M, b) °Vi ϕ];
(M, a) °Vj 2iϕ ⇔ ∀b ∈ N [(a ≤ b) ⇒ (M, b) °Vi ϕ];
Now we would like to illustrate with examples that the chosen language is flexible to
describe correctness of information in multi-agent environment.
Example 1. Agents (1) and (2) are in opposition for tomorrow:
(M, a) °Vj [N1p→N2¬p] ∧ [N2p→N1¬p].
This formula says that if one agent think tomorrow p will be true, the another one think
the opposite.
Example 2. Agents (1) and (2) are in opposition for truth of incontestable facts:
(M, a) °Vj [21p→22¬p] ∧ [22p→21¬p].
This formula says that now and always in future agents have opposite opinion, if one think
that a fact is always true, then another one think it always must be false.
Example 3. Agent (1) eventually out-argues agent (2)
(M, a) °V1 p ∧N1(p ∧ (p U122¬p)).
The formula says that p is true now in opinion of agent (1) and will be true some interval
of time in future, but then p will be false in opinion of (2).
Example 4. The fact is always possible in the opinion at least one agent but never
possible to be true in opinion of all agents
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(M, a) °V0 20[
∨
i∈[1,k]
3ip ∧20(p→¬(
∧
i∈[1,k]
3ip))].
Example 5. A fact p is always possible but suspicious:
(M, a) °V0 20[
∨
i∈[1,k]
3ip] ∧ ¬2030p.
This says that the fact p is always (from viewpoint of the global agent 0) possible by the
opinion of at least one agent. But p is not always is possible in opinion of the global agent
(0).
Now we pause briefly to discuss why the approach we offer is indeed innovative, why
we can not look at it as simply a mechanical combination of k - examples of the standard
linear temporal logic. Why it is really new and interesting, why standard technique cannot
directly work here.
That all is a consequence of the fact that in our definition of rules for computation
truth values of formulas, cf. above, recall:
(M, a) °Vj Niϕ ⇔ ∀b[(a Next b)⇒(M, b) °Vi ϕ];
(M, a) °Vj (ϕ Uiψ) ⇔ ∃b[(a ≤ b) ∧ ((M, b) °Vi ψ)∧
∀c[(a ≤ c < b)⇒(M, c) °Vi ϕ]].
So, we switch here the valuations for temporal operations: if the valuation is some Vj and
we compute truth value for a temporal operation with index i we switch j to i and use
further the valuation Vi. That seems correct and well justified: if a temporal statement
refers to an agent i, the opinion about truth for future to be its one. We give below one
illustrating examples. Consider the following:
Examples: Here (2) and (3) are agent’s indexes, N2, N3 are logical operations with rules
for computation their truth values defined above.
(M, a) °V1 p ∧N2(¬p ∧23p);
(M, a) °V1 p ∧N2(¬p ∧23(¬pN3p→(N2(N2(pU2q)))).
As you may see the computation of truth values in these formulas switches the valuations.
Therefore the standard technique cannot be directly applied here. That is in particular
because the standard rule of exchanging equivalents does not work.
Indeed if for a model M,
∀a, (M, a) °V0 20((p→ q) ∧ (q→p)),
it, generally speaking, does not imply
∀a, (M, a) °V0 21((p→ q) ∧ (q→p)).
Assume a class K of described models is given. We may assume that the rules of
definition of the global valuation V0 via agent’s valuations Vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k are fixed and
are the same for all models and all states of these models. Though the agent’s valuations
themselves may be various (that looks as most general case) but the rules imposed on the
agent’s valuations are the same for all states. For example, rules for agent’s valuations may
be with the limitation: for all states a,
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[||{i | (M, a) °Vi p}|| > k/2 + 1] ⇒[∀i(1 ≤ i ≤ k ⇒ (M, a) °Vi p)]. (1)
This means a uniform opinion, – if a majority of agent’s believe that a fact is true then
all of them think it is true.
Definition 4. A formula ϕ is said to be satisfiable in K if there is a model M ∈ K
and a state a ∈M such that (M, a) °Vj for some j.
Satisfiability problem for K is to resolve for any given formula if it is satisfiable in some
model from K. Assuming that K is chosen we may define the logic L(K) of this class, e.g.
as follows:
L(K) := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Form,∀M ∈ K, ∀a ∈M, ∀Vj [(M, a) °Vj p]}.
Assuming that all Vj are equal and V0 is the same as any Vj and all of them to be arbitrary,
we obtain that L(K) is just the standard linear temporal logic LTL. Bigger than this, any
j-fragment of any logic L(K) for the valuation Vj will be LTL. But, if combinations of
different temporal and modal operations for distinct agents are allowed, the possibility to
describe properties of multi-agent reasoning are much wider. For example, if (1) holds we
have[∨
X, X⊆{1,...,k},||X||>k/2+1[
∧
i∈X Nip] ⇒
∧
i∈{1,...,k}Nip
] ∈ L(K). (2)
Satisfiability problem for the logic L(K) generated by some K, is the satisfiability prob-
lem for the class K itself. For brevity in the sequel we write L instead L(K) assuming K
to be fixed. By a model M (if not specified otherwise) we understand a model from K.
3 Satisfiability Problem
We will need the special following modification of the k-models, – modelsM+Circle. Recall
that for n,m ∈ N with n < m [n,m] denotes the closed interval of all numbers situated
between n and m and these numbers n,m themselves.
Definition 5. Any M+Circle model has the following structure. For n, c(m),m ∈ N ,
where 0 < n < c(m) ≤ m, M+Circle = 〈[n,m],≤,Next, V1, . . . , Vk, V0〉) where Next(m) :=
c(m).
The rules for computation the truth values of formulas in such models w.r.t. any
Vj are defined exactly as earlier in the models, simply for states bigger than c(m) the
order ≤ to be replaced by possible runs via sequences by Next. More precisely we define
(M+Circle, a) °Vj (ϕUiψ) as follows. If a ∈ [0, c(m)] the definition is as earlier, if a > c(m),
(M+Circle, a) °Vj (ϕ Uiψ) ⇔∃b
[
(a ≤ b ≤ m) ∧ ((M+Circle, b) °Vi ψ)∧
∀c[(a ≤ c < b)⇒(M+Circle, c) °Vi ϕ]
]∨
∃d[(d > c(m)) ∧ ((M+Circle, d) °Vi ψ)∧
∀c[(a ≤ c ≤ m)⇒(M+Circle, c) °Vi ϕ]∧
∀c[(c(m) ≤ c < d)⇒(M+Circle, c) °Vi ϕ]
]
.
So, these rules act in accordance with the intuition of what is circled bypath by Next. For
any formula ϕ, Sub(ϕ) is the set of all its subformulas.
Let Tm(ϕ) be the temporal degree of ϕ. Recall that the temporal degree of formulas is
defined inductively: temporal degree of letters is 0, (ii) temporal degree of any formula with
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a temporal operation as the main one is the maximal temporal degree of the components
plus 1; (iii) temporal degree of any formula with a Boolean logic operation, as the main
one, is the maximal temporal degree of the components. Recall that k is the number of
agents in our models. Denote f(ϕ) := 2 × 2||Sub(ϕ)|| × k + 3. By the size of a model we
mean the number of states in this model.
Theorem 6. If a formula ϕ is satisfiable in a model M at a state by a valuation Vj,
then there exists a finite model of kind M+Circle with size at most f(ϕ) satisfying ϕ at the
world 0 by its own Vj.
Proof. LetM := 〈N ,≤,Next, V1, . . . , Vk, V0〉 be given and (M, a) °Vj ϕ. We evidently
may assume that a = 0. For any b ∈M, let
∀j ∈ [0, k],Subj(b) := {α ∈ Sub(ϕ) | (M, b) °Vj α}.
Let for all b ∈M,
Desc(b) := {Subj(b) | j ∈ [0, k]}.
Let for all b ∈M,
Ftr(b) := {Desc(c) | c ≥ b}.
A simple observation is that there is some cm ∈M, cm > 3 such that ∀d, g ≥ cm, Ftr(d) =
Ftr(g). This is the case because the sets Ftr(d) may only decrease while increasing d.
Take such minimal cm.
For any x ≥ 1, track of realizers from x is the minimal interval [x, y] (denoted in the
sequel as [x,Rls(x)]) starting from x such that
∀(ϕ1Ujϕ2) ∈ Sub(ϕ)
[∃i(M, x) °Vi (ϕ1Ujϕ2) ∧ (M, x) °Vi ¬ϕ2⇒
∃y ∈ Rls(x)((M, y) °Vi ϕ2) ∧ ∀z(x ≤ z < y)(M, z) °Vi ϕ1)]
∧
∀(Njϕ1) ∈ Sub(ϕ)[∃i(M, x) °Vi Njϕ1⇒(x+ 1) ∈ Rls(x)].
That minimal interval might be large but nonetheless it exists, we denote it by [x,Rls(x)].
Now we consider cm and [cm, Rls(cm)].
By our definition of cm there is dm > Rls(cm) + 2 such that Desc(dm) = Desc(cm).
Take such smallest dm and define now that Next(dm) := cm +1 and delete all states from
M which are strictly bigger than dm. Denote the obtained model by M+Circle. As we
noted before formulation of our theorem, the rules for truth values of formulas in such
model w.r.t. any Vi are defined exactly as earlier in the original k-models, simply for states
bigger than cm the order ≤ to be replaced by all possible sequences of states by Next.
Lemma 7. For any subformula ψ from Sub(ϕ) and any a ∈ M+Circle where a ≥ cm
and any Vj,
(M, a) °Vi ψ ⇔ (M+Circle, a) °Vi ψ,
Proof. We will prove it by induction on the length of ψ. For letters, it is evidently
true. Inductive steps for Boolean logical operations are evident as well. Let ψ = Njϕ1. If
a ≥ cm and a < dm the concussion
(M, a) °Vi Njϕ1 ⇔ (M+Circle, a) °Vi Njϕ1,
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follows immediately from the inductive assumption.
If a = dm then Next(dm) := cm + 1 and by indicative hypothesis
(M, cm + 1) °Vi ϕ1 ⇔ (M+Circle, cm + 1) °Vi ϕ1.
Therefore by Desc(dm) = Desc(cm) we obtain
(M, dm) °Vi Njϕ1 ⇔ (M+Circle, dm) °Vi Njϕ1.
Thus, the inductive proof for the operations Ni is completed. Consider now that case when
ψ = ϕ1Ujϕ2 ∈ Sub(ϕ).
Assume first that
(M, a) °Vi ϕ1Ujϕ2.
Then there exists smallest b ∈M such that b ≥ a and (M, b) °Vi ϕ2, and else either
(i): for all c, where a ≤ c < b, (M, b) °Vj ϕ1, or otherwise
(ii): b = a.
Assume first b ≤ dm; then by inductive assumption we obtain (M+Circle, b) °Vi ϕ2.
If (ii) holds (that is b = a) then (M+Circle, a) °Vi ϕ2 and hence we immediately
obtain (M+Circle, a) °Vi ϕ1Ujϕ2. If (ii) is not a case but (i) is, then we have that, for all
c, where a ≤ c < b, (M+Circle, b) °Vi ϕ1 holds by inductive hypothesis, and consequently,
M+Circle, a) °Vi ϕ1Uiϕ2.
Assume now that b > dm. Then the following holds (M, dm) °Vi ϕ1Ujϕ2. Applying
Desc(dm) = Desc(cm) we obtain (M, cm) °Vi ϕ1Uiϕ2. Using dm > Rls(cm), a ≤ dm and
the inductive assumption, from the fact that (M, a) °Vi ϕ1Ujϕ2 we have that there is the
path in M+Circle by Next leading from a into a state in [cm, Rls(cm)] where ϕ2 is true
w.r.t. Vi in M+Circle and that along this path always ϕ1 is true w.r.t. Vi in M+Circle.
That is we obtain (M+Circle, a) °Vi ϕ1Ujϕ2, which is what we need.
In opposite direction, assume now that
(M+Circle, a) °Vi ϕ1Ujϕ2.
By definition of the model M+Circle we have that a ≤ dm and there is a path by Next
in the M+Circle from a into some closest b ≤ dm satisfying ϕ2 w.r.t. Vi where, along this
path, always ϕ1 is true w.r.t. Vi in the model M+Circle. If
the path does not go via cm + 1 (3)
then for all c where a ≤ c < b ≤ dm, (M+Circle, c) °Vi ϕ1. Then using the inductive
assumption we conclude that for all such c, (M, c) °Vj ϕ1 holds, and consequently we
obtain (M, a) °Vi ϕ1Ujϕ2.
Assume now that
the path goes via cm + 1. (4)
Then (M+Circle, cm+1) °Vi ϕ1Ujϕ2 and using (3) we obtain (M, cm+1) °Vi ϕ1Ujϕ2
and applying the inductive assumption we conclude (M, a) °Vi ϕ1Ujϕ2. 2
Lemma 8. For any subformula ψ from Sub(ϕ) and any a ∈M+Circle and any Vj,
(M, a) °Vj ψ ⇔ (M+Circle, a) °Vj ψ,
Proof. The proof immediately follows from our previous lemma and the fact that the
initial part of the model M before cm while its transformation into the model M+Circle
8
let intact. So the verification is a routine standard computation by induction on length
the formulas. 2
Thus now by Lemma 8 we have that the model M+Circle also satisfies the formula ϕ
and this model is finite. We only need now to reduce the size of this model to a bound
computable from the size of ϕ.
Lemma 9. There is a model M+Circle satisfying ϕ and having the size at most f(ϕ).
Proof. We will use previous notation and proved above facts. Thus, M+Circle satisfies
ϕ. Take the smallest state 0 from M+Circle. First, recall that 2 ≤ cm − 1. Choose the
biggest b ∈ [1, cm − 1] such that
Desc(1) = Desc(b),
if one exists. In particular, it may happen that b = 1, then we do nothing at this stage.
Otherwise we delete all states from [1, b) in M+Circle and denote the resulting model by
M+Circle(1, b). We will show that for all s ∈M+Circle(1, b), any ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ) and any i,
(M+Circle, s) °Vi ψ ⇔ (M+Circle(1, b), s) °Vi ψ. (5)
For s ≥ b this statement is evident. It remains only to consider the case when s = 0. For
ψ to be a letter it is evident, and inductive steps of the proof by the length of ψ for Boolean
operations are again evident. Now assume that for a ψ (5) is proven and Njψ ∈ Sub(ϕ).
We claim that
(M+Circle, 0) °Vi Njψ ⇔ (M+Circle(1, b), 0) °Vi Njψ. (6)
This follows from (5) and our choice of b above with Desc(1) = Desc(b).
Let for ψ1 and ψ2 the statement (5) is proven and ψ1Ujψ2 ∈ Sub(ϕ).
Then if (M+Circle, 0) °Vi ψ1Ujψ2 we have either (M+Circle, 0) °Vi ψ2 and by inductive
assumption we receive (M+Circle(1, b), 0) °Vi ψ2 and we obtain (M+Circle(1, b), 0) °Vi
ψ1Ujψ2.
Or otherwise (M+Circle, 0) °Vi ¬ψ2 and then (M+Circle, 0) °Vi ψ1, and besides we
have that (M+Circle, 1) °Vi ψ1Ujψ2. Then by our choice of b above with Desc(1) =
Desc(b) we obtain (M+Circle, b) °Vi ψ1Ujψ2. Therefore (M+Circle(1, b), b) °Vi ψ1Ujψ2.
By inductive assumption it follows that (M+Circle, 0) °Vi ψ1 implies (M+Circle(1, b), 0) °Vi
ψ1. That overall gives to us that
(M+Circle(1, b), 0) °Vi ψ1Ujψ2.
In opposite direction, assume that (M+Circle)(1, b), 0) °Vi ψ1Ujψ2. Then, if we as-
sume that (M+Circle(1, b), 0) °Vi ψ2, this by inductive assumption yields the statement
(M+Circle, 0) °Vi ψ2 and consequently (M+Circle, 0) °Vi ψ1Ujψ2.
Assume now that (M+Circle(1, b), 0) °Vi ¬ψ2. Then (M+Circle(1, b), 0) °Vi ψ1 and
we have (M+Circle(1, b), b) °Vi ψ1Ujψ2. Therefore (M+Circle, b) °Vj ψ1Ujψ2 since b ≥ b
and (5). (M+Circle(1, b), 0) °Vi ψ1 yields (M+Circle, 0) °Vi ψ1. So, (M+Circle), 0) °Vi
ψ1Ujψ2. Thus we proved that
(M+Circle, 0) °Vj ψ1Ujψ2⇔(M+Circle(1, b), 0) °Vj ψ1Ujψ2. (7)
This statement concludes the proof of (5).
Now we continue the proof of our Lemma 9. Considering b as we initially did above with
0 inM+Circle, and subsequently making similar reformations moving to cm, we do as much
steps as much various Descr(s) may happen, so finite, effectively bounded amount of steps.
So, we then receive a model similar to M+Circle, but which has at most 2||Sub(ϕ)|| × k + 3
states before cm. Since this stage, we make similar rarefication in the loop path inM+Circle
from cm + 1 to itself cm+1. This concludes the proof of our Theorem 6.
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Theorem 10. If a formula ϕ is satisfiable in a finite model M+Circle then it is
satisfiable in some k-model M.
Proof. LetM+Circle = 〈[n, c(m)]∪[c(m),m],≤,Next, V1, . . . , Vk, V0〉) where Next(m) :=
c(m), and for some i, (M+Circle) °Vi ϕ. Consider the infinite k-modelM with the follow-
ing structure: the base set N of this model is the sequence of all states [n, c(m)]∪ [c(m) +
1,m] and the infinite amount of states combined from the intervals of states situated in
the interval [c(m)+1,m] repeated one by one, where Next(m) = c(m)+1. The valuations
Vj on this model to be just transferred from the model M+Circle. This is immediate to
show (simple computation by induction of length the formulas) that, for any (absolutely
any) formula ψ constructed out of letters from ϕ,
∀a ∈M+Circle, ∀Vi [(M+Circle, a) °Vi ψ ⇔ (M, a) °Vi ψ.]
So, this model M will satisfy the formula ϕ. 2
Recall that a logic L(K) is decidable if for any formula ϕ we may compute if ϕ ∈ L(K).
Observe that ϕ ∈ L(K) iff ¬ϕ is not satisfiable in L(K). From Theorems 6 and 10 we
immediately obtain
Theorem 11. The satisfiability problem for L(K)is decidable (so the logic L(K) is
decidable). For a formula ϕ to be satisfiable it is sufficient to check its satisfiability at
models M+Circle of size at most f(ϕ).
4 Linear Interval Multi-Agent Temporal Logic
In this section we will consider the case when the models are not linear and even non-
transitive, but are compound from some fragments of our temporal models from the pre-
vious section. We think that the case is indeed interesting and useful for applications.
The matter is that the assumption that all computational runs are linear and potentially
infinite is too strong. In fact, always the all resources are limited, they may be sufficiently
big, but with some assumed upper bound. We aim to represent such limitation as follows.
Let we chop the set of all natural numbers N into an infinite sequence of closed intervals:
[si, si + ki], i ∈ N ; that is we assume that N =
⋃
i∈N [si, si + ki], si < si+1, and that
si + ki ≥ si+1, si + ki < si+1 + ki+1.
So, we admit that the intervals may have possible nonempty not one state overlap, that
is, it could be that [si, si + ki] ∩ (si+1, si+1 + ki+1] 6= ∅, so these intervals may have a
non-empty and not one state common part.
Temporal Interval Linear k-model with agent’s multi-valuations is the structure
M := 〈
⋃
i∈N
[si, si + ki],≤,Next, V0, V1, . . . , Vk〉,
where ≤ is the standard linear order on N , Next is the standard next binary relation,
and any Vi is a valuation. But for V0 we as earlier assume that V0 is a global valuation
computed via valuations of the agents by some common rules (as we assumed before).
That models are intended to describe real computation in bounded time. In the case
when si+1 = si+1 it is just somewhat like immediate passing of information. In case when
[si, si+ki]∩ (si+1, si1+ki+1] 6= ∅, this models the situation when it might be that the next
computational run started before the previous one was completed and they work sharing
the resources and the information.
For such models we may define truth values of formulas exactly the same way as in
the previous section - for pure linear time, with only a distinction on definition truth
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values of the formulas containing operations Um - until ones. The definition is as follows:
∀a ∈ [si+1, si+1 + ki+1] \ [si, si + ki],
(M, a) °Vj (ϕ Umψ) ⇔ ∃b ∈M
[
(a ≤ b ≤ si+1 + ki+1)∧
((M, b) °Vm ψ) ∧ ∀c[(a ≤ c < b)⇒((M, c) °Vm ϕ)]
]
.
Thus, any Um works as usual but is bounded by the upper boundary of the local run
– by si + ki. This corresponds very well with usual intuition concerning computational
procedures and the computational runs - the solution (a state satisfying the formula) should
(if exists) be reached before the end of computation for the current local computational
possess. We think that structures of such models and their properties are clear. But
nonetheless we give below some illustrative examples.
Examples.
(I) M := 〈
⋃
i∈N
[si, si + ki],≤,Next, V0, V1, . . . , Vk〉,
where si := i2, ki := (i+ 1)2 − i2 so bounds are squares of numbers. Here the intersection
of the time intervals are only bounds - numbers i2.
(II) M := 〈
⋃
i∈N
[si, si + ki],≤,Next, V0, V1, . . . , Vk〉,
where si := (10 × i), ki := (10 × (i + 1)) − (10 × i) + 5. Now the intersection of the time
intervals are not only bounds, e.g. [s0, s0 + k0] ∪ (s1, s1 + k1] = [11, 15].
As in Section 2 earlier, we denote an arbitrary class of any such models by K and denote
the logic generated by this class as L(K); the satisfiability of formulas and decidability of
the logic defined as earlier.
For any model M described above, the model M(−) is the one obtained from M by
deleting all states of all intervals [si, si+1] situated strictly bigger than certain fixed number
n in (sm, sm + km, and by defining Next(n) = sm.
Lemma 12. If a formula ϕ is satisfiable in a model M at 0 by a valuation Vj, then
there exists a finite model of kind M(−) satisfying ϕ at the world 0 by its own Vj where
the size of M(−) is at most 2||Sub(ϕ)|| × k + 3 and the number of the sates si in this model
is at most the temporal degree of the formula ϕ plus 2.
Proof. Let a model
M := 〈
⋃
i∈N
[si, si + ki],≤,Next, V0, V1, . . . , Vk〉,
satisfies a formula ϕ: (M, 0) °Vj ϕ. Let the temporal degree of ϕ is m. Using the
standard argument on temporal degree of the formulas, we may assume that the model
is shortened now by deleting all states strictly bigger than sm+2 + km+2 and defining
Next(sm+2+km+2) = sm+2+km+2, where m is the temporal degree of ϕ. And this model
will satisfy ϕ at 0 as well.
So, now we assume that our model M has this structure. The number of intervals
[si, si+ki] in this model is at most m+2. Now we will rarefy this model starting from the
bottom interval [s0, s0 + k0]. For [s0, s0 + k0] we carry out the proof exactly as in Lemma
9 starting from considering the interval [s0, s0 + k0] as [1, cm − 1] in Lemma 9 making
rarefication as it is shown there. This transformation will not change the truth values of
subformulas of ϕ, and, in particular, s0 and s0 + k0 will remain intact. Sine this point we
continue this rarefication procedure for resulting [s1, s1+k1] and so forth. In at most m+2
steps this procedure will be completed. And the resulting model will satisfy ϕ at 0. 2
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Lemma 13. If a formula ϕ is satisfiable in a finite model M(−) described in Lemma
12 at the state 0 by a valuation Vj, then ϕ may be satisfied in an infinite model M of our
class.
Proof. Proof is a standard argument using the temporal degree of formulas. 2
From Lemmas 12 and 13 we immediately infer
Theorem 14. The satisfiability problem for the logic L(K) is decidable. For verification
that a formula ϕ is satisfiable it is sufficient to check its satisfiability at models M(−) of
size at most 2||Sub(ϕ)|| × k + 3.
5 Conclusion
We think that research from this paper may be essentially extended, many interesting prob-
lems remain open. The case when the global valuation would be computed via valuation
of agent’s at states not uniformly, – but by rules specific for any state, is not considered
yet. Another venue not explored yet is the computation of truth at states when we con-
sider many valued values (e.g. from some intervals of possible truth values, as e.g. in
ÃLukasiewicz logics, or as in Fuzzy Logic). The open yet question is to consider models with
lacunaes in computational runs. That is the one, – when the agents may see not all future,
– but have some lacunaes of not visible intervals, which they do not see, and when rules
for computation truth values for temporal and modal operations are accordingly enrolled.
The extension of our results to branching time logic is very interesting task. Investigation
of admissibility for rules and validity of rules is such logics is very interesting. The admis-
sibility of rules was an area of most attraction for the author for a long time (cf. [17,21,22])
and also many strong results about admissibility were obtained by other researchers (cf.
e.g. [23,24,25,26]). That area is very closer to unification problematic (cf. [27,28,23,29])
and it is very interesting to extend the unification theory to logics within framework of
this our paper.
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